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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research is to establish and analyze trends for direct labor 
man-days charged to selected 688-class submarines at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
(PHNSY). Based on recommendations from previous studies, this research is focused on 
analyzing the 100 Series of maintenance for nine selected submarines undergoing 
Docking Selected Restricted Availabilities (DSRAs) between 2010 and 2015. The 100 
Series includes the hull and tanks, which frequently experience work growth over the 
availability. Additionally, further analysis was conducted on a possible hull-age 
correction factor used to explain increased labor trends, and a simple Monte Carlo 
simulation was used in an attempt to estimate final labor cost of the DSRAs. Our research 
is aimed at identifying existing trends and attempting to explain why those trends may 
exist. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide information, analysis, and direction for the 
Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) with respect to the 
increasing costs and duration of submarine maintenance availabilities. More specifically, this 
thesis identifies and explores trends between labor man-days charged for the 100 Series of 
maintenance and duration of availability. Additionally, a model was developed in an attempt 
to better describe Corporate Cost Assessment (CA) variability. 
Progressive increases in cost and duration in submarine maintenance at Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard is affecting the submarine force’s ability to plan and execute the Navy’s 
missions. With recent DON budget trends remaining relatively flat when adjusted for inflation 
and as a percentage of GDP, reducing inefficiency is key to restoring the submarine force 
readiness. From our data, between FY2010 to FY2016 only 38 percent of DSRAs completed 
at PHNSY were completed on time. These delays result in lost operational time, lack of assets 
available to Geographical Combatant Commanders for operations, and increasing cost for 
submarine repairs and upgrades.  
The relevant research previously completed with respect to submarine maintenance at 
PHNSY show how the understanding of the issues has evolved and what questions have been 
answered. In general, the research has gone from a top-level review to a more specific view at 
the SWLIN level.  
The research already completed has provided the following results in reference to the 
anecdotal claims for the relevant submarines:  
• OPINTERVALs have not actually exceeded 48 months (Whitney, 2018). 
• Hull age is not correlated with DSRA duration (Whitney, 2018). 
• The 500 SWLIN Series and the 100 SWLIN Series are the largest increases 
in man-days for selected availabilities (Isley, Seagrave, & Shiver, 2018). 
xvi 
• Cost Variance and BQWS do not trend as expected for the selected 
availabilities analyzed (Wheeler, 2019). 
In order to conduct further analysis on the 100 SWLIN Series, we used data provided 
by SUBPAC, SUBMEPP, and PHNSY on nine specific 688-class submarine DSRA 
availabilities conducted at PHNSY from 2010 to 2016. The 100 SWLIN series of work focuses 
on the submarine hull and internal tanks. The data used comes from autopsy reports, key events 
data, PMC data, and other schedule data. This data was used to determine the specific work 
within the 100 Series that by percentage was causing the largest increase in man-days 
expended. This will help SUBPAC and PHNSY conduct further investigation into this problem 
area to develop a comprehensive solution.  
After analysis of the data we made the following conclusions: 
• Applying a hull-age correction factor to the DSRA availabilities and within 
the 100 Series reduces the magnitude of the growth increase, but does not 
remove the trend. Hull age does not drive the expended labor increase.  
• SWABs 131, 132 show significant, consistent growth. 
• SWAB 131, group 27, 44, 82 contribute the majority of growth within the 
SWAB. 
• SWAB 132, group 27, 74, 82 contribute the majority of growth within the 
SWAB. 
• SWAB 131, group 27, component 0165 demonstrated consistent growth. 
• SWAB 132, group 27, component 0200 demonstrated consistent growth. 
• New Work does not account for a significant increase in expended man-days. 
• Cost Variance in the 100 Series trends negative which is unexpected for a 
learning organization that incorporates historical work into future 
availabilities. 
xvii 
• CA2 to CA3 and FRE to Actual man-days expended models produced 
estimates to better inform planners of expected maximum CA3 man-days and 
Actual man-days expended.  
In response to these conclusions, we recommend the following topics for future studies: 
• Compare and analyze the trends in the 500 and 100 Series at other shipyards 
during a similar period of time. 
• Identify and analyze maintenance items experiencing highest increases in 500 
and 100 Series to ship schedules and determine if they became, or were, 
critical path items.  
In addition, we recommend the following actions be taken by relevant responsible 
organizations: 
• Evaluate planning and labor estimation processes at PHNSY 
• Utilize probabilistic modeling for cost estimation and schedule risk 
• Report on the continuous Availability Work Package (AWP) feedback loop 
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This thesis continues the research in an ongoing study to help determine the cause 
of increasing costs and duration of submarine maintenance availabilities at Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard (PHNSY). With the direction and assistance of Commander, Submarine 
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) and by Submarine Maintenance Engineering, 
Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), we obtained a wide range of data for selected 
688-class submarine availabilities at PHNSY. Prior theses indicated the 500 Series 
SLWINs, which included auxiliary systems, were a primary contributor to the increase in 
duration and final cost for the selected availabilities. Whitney in 2018 recommended that 
the 100 Series SWLINs required additional research to determine its impact on schedule 
and cost (Whitney, 2018). Analysis conducted in this thesis provides an indication that 
submarine overall processes improvements and data collection improvements are 
necessary to reduce overall cost and increase submarine availability.  
1. Problem Statement 
The cost and duration of U.S. Navy 688-class submarine DSRAs at PHNSY are 
increasing (Whitney, 2018). This increase in duration and cost results in lost operational 
availability and reduces the total number of ships available to execute critical missions and 
meet force requirements. In December 2016, the U.S. Navy announced it required 66 attack 
submarines in order to meet its regional obligations throughout the geographic Combatant 
Commands (COCOMs) (O’Rourke, 2019). According to O’Rourke, as of early 2019, the 
fleet consisted of only 51 attack submarines and is to continue declining until FY2028. Due 
to the inactivation rate of the 688-class and the construction rate of new Virginia-class 
attack submarines, by FY2028 it is expected that there will only be 42 attack submarines 
available (O’Rourke, 2019). O’Rourke goes on to say that there has been discussion 
regarding a few options to boost the minimum number of attack submarines in FY2028, to 
include nuclear refueling of certain 688s, this is not certain or guaranteed. In order to 
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maintain maximum readiness and operational availability, reducing the duration of 
shipyard availabilities for the shrinking force is critical. 
As the United States Department of Defense (DoD) continues to operate in a 
resource constrained environment, being good stewards of taxpayer dollars is critical. 
Defense discretionary spending has been and will likely always be constrained by increases 
in mandatory entitlements such as health care, social security, and debt servicing, to name 
a few (Candreva, 2017). Therefore, efficient resource allocation is important. Cost of 
submarine maintenance availabilities has increased over time as a result of increased man-
days spent repairing the submarine. Over-budget projects continue to burden the Navy and 
result in lost operational time for some units, and leave less funding available for other 
units desperately in need of repair. Within the House DoD Appropriations Act for FY2020, 
three submarines, USS Boise, USS Hartford and USS Columbus appeared on the unfunded 
priorities list due to shortages in funding and shipyard capacity (Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2019). With fewer submarines available and with a constrained 
budget, maximizing efficiency is key for the DoD and the Department of the Navy (DON). 
Submarine maintenance may be one area where costs can be reduced, and efficiency 
increased, to improve submarine readiness.  
2. Research Questions 
1. Does controlling for hull age help explain the identified increase in 
expended man-days over the studied DSRAs? 
2. Within the identified increase of expended man-days across the DSRAs, 
what is the contribution of the maintenance included in the 100 Series?  
3. Which Ship Work Authorization Boundary’s (SWABs) within the 100 
Series show the largest growth over time? 
4. Within the growing SWABs, which Ship Work List Item Numbers 
(SWLINs) and subset maintenance groups and components are 
contributing most to the growth of the 100 Series?  
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5. Does categorized “New Work” demonstrate a relationship with DSRA 
duration and is it significant to expended labor? 
6. Can a model be developed to better estimate the maximum expended man-
days for CA3, and a completed DSRA?  
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
In order to draw comparisons between availabilities, research was limited to the 
following: 
• Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA): Though no single 
DSRA is the same as another, for this comparison to help control for time 
spent at sea, hull age, and general work performed DSRAs at PHNSY 
were selected. If the analysis included all submarine work conducted at 
PHNSY, it would increase variability as a result of shorter and longer 
duration availabilities with different repair goals and at different hull age.  
• Los Angeles Class (688-class) Submarines: The configuration of different 
class submarines currently serving in the Navy’s submarine fleet varies 
greatly. By controlling for class of ship going through DSRA we remove 
variability of individual maintenance items skewing the data and affecting 
the conclusion of the thesis. Although maintenance across all hulls in the 
DSRA are not the same, trends can still be identified.  
• Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY): For this thesis, work performed at 
only the PHNSY will be considered. This limited the variation between 
shipyards and how maintenance is conducted. Including other shipyards 
DSRA work may skew data and hide problems or trends that may be 
beneficial to the results of the analysis. A thesis that can obtain DSRA 
data from all public shipyards may be able to draw different conclusion in 
the comparison of the performance of different shipyards for the same 
work.  
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• 100 Series (Hull Structure and Appurtenances) SWLINs: The focus of this 
thesis will be on the SWLINs included in the 100 Series of work that is 
focused on the various hulls and tanks of the submarine. This limitation in 
scope allows this thesis to identify trends within the 100 Series and 
provide that feedback to availability planners at PHNSY and 
COMSUBPAC. This focus is based on the recommendation of Whitney’s 
previous research (2018).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. LOS ANGELES–CLASS (688-CLASS) SUBMARINES 
The writers of this thesis are qualified U.S. Submariners with a significant amount 
of time spent in Pearl Harbor. Both writers spent time on Los Angeles Class Submarines 
and spent time in maintenance overhauls at PHNSY.  
1. 688 Class Overview 
Submarines in the 688 class are fast-attack, nuclear-powered, submersible ships. 
They are owned and operated by the U.S. Navy and employed on Anti-Surface Warfare, 
Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Mine Warfare, and Strike missions. O’Rourke documented 
that succeeding the Sturgeon Class and preceding the Seawolf class, 62 Los Angeles class 
were produced between 1972 and 1996 (O’Rourke, 2019). They have a nominal service 
life of 30 years which is limited by their nuclear reactor refueling requirements as well as 
hull life. There are some 688-class submarines that are being extended past 30 years based 
on remaining nuclear fuel life and good hull performance over time. There are different 
configurations and upgrades that were conducted over the life of the ship class that will be 
discussed below. 
2. Differences within the 688 Class 
There are three main versions of the 688-class submarine, the 688 (better known as 
“first flight”), the VLS flight, and the 688I (or “second flight”). The main differences are 
that first flight 688s have no Vertical Launch System (VLS) and have fairwater planes on 
the sail. The VLS flight has fairwater planes and four VLS tubes for launching Tomahawk 
missiles. 688I, or second flight 688s, have 12 VLS tubes and bow planes instead of 
fairwater planes. 
Through the years numerous modifications were made to the 688-class submarine 
including changes to Forward Compartment Upper Level layout with significant changes 
to the radio room, engine room changes including changes to the main engines, and 
changes to the SONAR and Fire Control systems. Though there have been improvements 
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and modifications over the construction time frame, major system components such as 
Ship’s Service Hydraulics, Steering and Diving Hydraulics, and major cooling systems 
remained mostly similar. Modifications to these systems are generally minor, including 
changing to piping layout, pump sizes, loads off systems. Based on this it is assumed that 
the modifications made to major hydraulic, electrical, and cooling systems would not 
greatly affect the cost of the maintenance over time.  
3. General Layout 
Los Angeles–class submarines are divided into two watertight compartments. The 
forward compartment which houses berthing, galley, the crews mess, the officers 
wardroom, weapons systems, control, and required control systems. The aft watertight 
compartment is the Engine Room which contains the nuclear reactor and associated 
machinery to assist in propulsion of the ship and well as the electrical generation equipment 
required for the ship.  
B. DOCKING SELECTED RESTRICTED AVAILABILITIES (DSRA) 
According to the 2019 issue of the OPNAVNOTE 4700.7, the definition of an 
“availability” is the temporary period of time during a submarine’s Operational Interval 
(OPINTERVAL) when it is removed from the operational status and designated to be 
available for maintenance and alterations (Chief of Naval Operations, 2019). Docking 
Selected Restricted Availabilities are an availability that requires the ship to enter a dry 
dock to complete certain repairs or complete required inspections. Typically, DRSA's 
include more intrusive and complex repairs since some or all of the availability is 
completed in a dry dock.  
C. LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE 
Submarine maintenance is conducted at three separate levels based on resources 
required and complexity required to complete the repair. The three levels are 
Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot Level.  
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1. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
This is the lowest level of maintenance and is generally within the capability of 
ships force. This maintenance is completed during in-port periods or while out to sea and 
does not impede mission tasking.  
2. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
Intermediate Level (I-Level) maintenance exceeds the resources or capability of 
ships force but does not requires Depot Level resources. The Fleet Maintenance Activity 
(FMA) is responsible for providing the required resources and expertise to complete this 
maintenance. At Pearl Harbor, I-Level maintenance is completed by the Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility (IMF).  
3. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot Level (D-Level) maintenance consists of major repair, fabrication, 
modification, refurbishment or upgrading that requires the resources and capabilities that 
exceed the I-Level maintenance. This work is generally conducted by a shipyard. In Pearl 
Harbor, this work is conducted by the PHNSY. D-Level maintenance will often require the 
ship to be placed in a dry dock for an extended period of time.  
D. SCHEDULING AND MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
The 688-class submarine uses an Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) to plan and 
conduct maintenance availabilities to ensure the submarine maximizes its operational life 
of 30+ years. The EOC is a maintenance strategy that keeps ships in acceptable material 
condition while sustaining maximum operational availability. To accomplish this period 
inspections of selected systems are inspected and documented for material condition 
trends. Periodic maintenance tasks are accomplished at specific time intervals, and the 
ships life cycle contains a combination of minor and major availabilities scheduled to 
conduct maintenance and modernization (Chief of Naval Operations, 2013). 
This schedule is based on the approved OPINTERVAL. The OPINTERVAL is the 
max duration that a submarine may operate between accomplishing specific D-Level 
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maintenance. This maintenance can be conducted in either a major or a minor Chief of 
Naval Operations availability (CNO availability). An operational cycle (OPCYCLE) is a 
specific operating period whose duration is defined by the requirement to accomplish D-
Level maintenance that can only be accomplished during major CNO availabilities. Major 
CNO availability’s OPCYCLE are every 10 years or 120 months, and the OPINTERVAL 
for 688-class submarines is 72 months (Chief of Naval Operations, 2013). 
Typically, a submarine will have three I-Level availabilities between deployments, 
Continuing Maintenance Availability (CMAV), Pre-Overseas Movement 1 (POM1), and 
Pre-Overseas Movement 2 (POM2). This structure allows flexibility and continued training 
for the ship while preparing the ship for another deployment and additional time at sea for 
training and preparation. Some ships may require additional maintenance due to urgent 
repairs realized during training and may require a POM3 prior to deployment.  
The most recent change to OPINTERVAL and OPCYCLE increased the amount 
of time between D-Level maintenance from 48 months to 72 months and as a result 
increased the amount of maintenance that much be conducted at the DSRAs and other 
availabilities (Chief of Naval Operations, 2013). 
E. SUBMARINE INVENTORY 
In December 2016, a change in the Navy force level goal required there to be 66 
attack submarines included in the total force level goal of 355 ships (O’Rourke, 2019). 
This change was to counter the current threats faced by China, Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea. However, as a result of low production levels through the mid-1990s into the mid-
2000s, force levels are set to decrease from their current level of 51 ships in FY2018 to a 
minimum of 42 ships in FY2027 with the final level of 66 ships not reached until FY2048 
(O’Rourke, 2019). 
In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought a dramatic reduction in defense 
expenditures (O’Rourke, 2019). The reduction in defense spending directly influenced the 
shipbuilding plan, and the completion of the Seawolf submarine program. The Seawolf 
submarine was designed to directly combat the most advanced new Russian submarine 
threats and included new firepower, advanced quieting techniques, new SONAR systems, 
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and advanced propulsion techniques (O’Rourke, 2019). However, the cost of the Seawolf 
and the end of the Cold War would quickly signal the end for the Seawolf program after 
only three ships being built. Though the last Seawolf submarine became operational in 
2005, and the commissioning of the USS Virginia occurred in 2004, from 1997 until 2004 
only four submarines were built (O’Rourke, 2019). From FY2005 to FY2010 only one VA 
Class submarine was acquired per year. From FY2011 until FY2019 two Virginia Class 
submarines have been procured per year (O’Rourke, 2019). As a result of this large 
reduction in ship building between 1997 and 2005, and the continued high rate of 
decommissioning of 688-class submarines, force levels continue to decrease.  
The Reagan administration shipbuilding plan called for a 600 ship Navy including 
maintaining 100 SSNs (O’Rourke, 2019). O’Rourke goes on to describe the history of the 
SSN requirement. In the George H.W. Bush administration, a proposed force level goal in 
1991 of 400 ships included 80 SSNs. However, due to the end of the Cold War and no 
foreseeable great power to go against, this number was later reduced to 51–67 SSNs 
including 10–12 Seawolf Class Submarines (O’Rourke, 2019). In 1993, the Clinton 
Administration furthered lowered that number establishing a plan of 45 to 55 SSNs. In 
1997, the Clinton administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) established a goal 
of 55 SSNs based on the reduced global tensions and the needs of a peacetime navy. The 
SSN force level remained fairly constant from the 1997 QDR through George W. Bush’s 
administration, being adjusted down to requiring 48 ships in 2006 (O’Rourke, 2019). This 
figure remained unchanged until 2016 when it was updated to 66 submarines as part of a 
355 ship force Navy (O’Rourke, 2019). 
The cause of the severe shortage in SSNs dates back to the financial decisions of 
the U.S. Congress and the DoD between FY1997 and FY2013 (O’Rourke, 2019). When 
the Virginia Class Submarine procurement began in the 1990s, the DoD projected the 
procurement would increase to two ships per year in FY2002. However, in subsequent 
budgets, the date for initiating two per-year procurements was gradually pushed back until 
FY2010 (O’Rourke, 2019). This resulted in only four submarines being acquired from 
FY1997 to FY2013, greatly affecting the current force levels. With VA-Class production 
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limited to two submarines per-year with no increase in sight, force levels will continue to 
decrease until FY2028 (O’Rourke, 2019).  
F. PLANNING FALLACY AND PARKINSON’S LAW 
Planning Fallacy is the behavior associated with underestimation of time necessary 
to complete a task, and regardless of the time given to complete the project people struggle 
to meet the deadlines. This is an elemental human tendency. Described as a form of 
procrastination, a overly-optimistic individual will overestimate their ability and 
performance and underestimate the time required to complete the task (Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994). As a result, according to Buehler et al. (1994), when faced with few or no 
intermediate timelines that are enforced, individuals or teams will typically increase work 
output towards the end of the project rather than expend a consistent output to reach the 
desired end state. Experts are often used to provide their best assessment when estimating 
or predicting something that contains uncertainty (Buehler et al., 1994) . People often rely 
on singular information or information that consists of evidence about the particular 
decision, but rarely include distributional information. Buehler et al., describe Kahneman 
and Tversky’s distributional information, base-rate data, or consisting of information about 
the distribution of outcomes that are possible. This states that duration estimates (estimates 
for the time required to complete a single job, or to complete an entire task) should be 
based on a probabilistic model. This helps account for randomness of schedule (Buehler et 
al., 1994). 
Parkinson’s Law, on the other hand, indicates that without sufficient or adequate 
incentives, and proper management, projects that are given longer to complete will always 
grow to fill the allotted time (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 1991). Take for example a 
maintenance worker, he or she is given a task that is expected to take eight hours, if they 
finish the task early they can expect to be assigned more work without further reward. It is 
less stressful for the individual to work on the same job for eight hours versus finishing it 
in five and changing jobs. Though the job has the potential to be completed early and 
properly, allowing more to be completed on the aggregate, the worker has no incentive to 
do that (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 1991). According to Gutierrez & Kouvelis, under 
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Parkinson’s Law, additional worker time available may signal less workers are needed. In 
order to reduce tasking, workers aim to hit or exceed allotted time for a job in order to 
signal to managers more personnel are needed on these jobs. This reduces the work load 
for the individual, but increases overall time spent on a job needlessly (Gutierrez & 
Kouvelis, 1991).  
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III. PLANNING 
Jobs are initially scheduled to be completed within a DSRA are considered notional. 
These notional jobs are determined by SUBMEPP and Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA). Based on historical data, jobs are determined to have an estimated time to 
completion. This estimate is used to determine notional man-days for a generic DSRA. The 
Technical Foundation Paper (TFP) is a primary maintenance strategy document produced 
by SUBMEPP for a class of ship with expected maintenance durations and number of man-
days expected to complete availabilities (SUBMEPP, 2018). SUBMEPP periodically 
reviews the TFP and updates expected number of man-days to complete a series of work 
and the overall project. These changes are driven by historical averages as well as periodic 
requirement changes. 
Additional maintenance is scheduled as a result of the ship’s needs. Maintenance 
items are added prior to the start of the availability through analysis of ship systems during 
tours, inspections and review of ship generated issues or outstanding maintenance issues 
from previous availabilities. These ship specific maintenance items are added to the 
standard list of repairs and inspections to generate the Corporate Cost Assessments (CA1, 
CA2, CA3). As the ship gets closer to the start of the availability, the accuracy of what 
must be completed increases. Thus, CA3 is a better representation of what will be 
completed during the availability compared to CA1. The final planning meeting (FPM) 
occurs approximately four months from the start of the availability in which the baseline 
work is set. The work established at the FPM goes into CA3 and should be representative 
of maintenance performed during the DSRA. The Navy sends its CA3 to the performing 
shipyard (PHNSY), after which they review the estimate and send back their estimate of 
number of man-days to complete the maintenance. 
Once the ship arrives in the shipyard, a more thorough investigation is completed 
of ship systems and additional work is often identified. In many cases, some spaces can 
only be inspected once the ship is in Dry Dock such as the floodable spaces in the ballast 
tanks. The TFP maintains a percentage of new work for the availability as part of the overall 
man-days for the availability. Rev B of the TFP maintained approximately 16% new work 
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for the 100–700 series. Rev C increased new work to approximately 21% of total man-days 
expended for the 100–700 series (baseline, non-nuclear ship alts, unique work, new work 
included in total) (SUBMEPP, 2018). 
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IV. DETERMINATION OF THE MAN-DAY ESTIMATE 
A. NOTIONAL MAN-DAYS 
For the initial planning of the DSRA, the availability planners use the TFP to determine 
the notional man-days and thus cost to repair the submarine. Notional man-days estimated by 
the TFP are based on the Ship Availability and Planning Engineering Center (SHAPEC) Job 
Summary 3. The SHAPEC estimates are maintained current with NAVSEA and naval 
shipyard corporate production standards and practices. The estimates are validated through 
trend analysis for necessary component repairs, estimate feedback reviews, and by 
incorporating improvements through a lessons learned program. Sources of improvements 
include Deficiency Logs (DL), process review comments for naval shipyards who use the 
estimates, Critique and Trouble Reports, and reviews of new technical requirements and 
reductions in work scope. 
B. CA1, CA2, CA3 ESTIMATES 
Beginning with the notional man-day estimates in the TFP, these values will be refined 
for each unique DSRA at Corporate Cost Assessment (CA) events and reported in documents 
referred to as CA1, CA2 and CA3. Based on conditions-based maintenance and corrective 
action-based estimates conducted through investigations and reports during previous 
availabilities and inspection, additional work is added to the baseline man-day estimate. CA1 
to CA2 to CA3 does not always result in additional man-days added to the estimate. Ship 
repairs may occur prior to the DSRA which may affect scope of work or the need to complete 
specific work, which may result in a reduction of man-days required.  
C. FINAL REVIEW ESTIMATE 
One month prior to the ship entering the shipyard to commence the DSRA, the shipyard 
commander sends a certified estimate for the completion of the DSRA to COMSUBPAC 
outlining the expected duration of the availability, number of man-days to complete the work, 
and an explanation of large difference in man-days between CA3 and the FRE. This difference 
is often based on labor required to complete specified jobs or additional labor required to 
support completion of the availability.  
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V. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CURRENT ISSUES AND RELATED STUDIES 
With many ship projects across the DON frequently late and over budget, 
attempting to understand the cause and methods to reduce these issues have been studied. 
We first describe Baumgartner due to her significance to our thesis. In her 2018 work, 
“Analysis of Capacity and Schedule Risk in SSN-688 Class Submarine Dry-Dock 
Maintenance Operations,” Baumgartner compares data from 688 DSRAs conducted before 
and after implementation of the 72-month Optimized Fleet Readiness Plan (OFRP) 
maintenance cycle and searched for maintenance which led to schedule delays and 
increased schedule risk. Her results showed that 688-class DSRAs have taken longer to 
complete since the OFRP shift and that there is a significant correlation between the DSRA 
duration and the amount of new work added to that DSRA, specifically within the 500 
Series SWLINs. She shows that while overall work performed in the 500 Series is 
increasing over time from DSRA to DSRA, the Series also shows greater variability across 
those DSRA datasets, which indicated that the work scheduled and completed was 
inconsistent. This likely causes inherent difficulties in the planning process.  
The next investigation into submarine maintenance at PHNSY was by Whitney in 
2018. In his work, “The Impact of Direct Man-Days Executed on Submarine Maintenance 
Availability Delays,” Whitney analyzed direct man-days charged to 688-class DSRAs at 
PHNSY across direct labor SWLINs to identify statistical relationships between direct 
labor costs and DSRA start date, hull age, duration, and OPINTERVAL. There are two 
results from his work which are relevant to our thesis. First, shifting from a 48-month to 
72-month OPINTERVAL is not the cause of maintenance delays. This is important for our 
thesis since our data spans the change between the 48-month OPINTERVAL and the 72-
month OPINTERVAL. Second, when the duration of the DSRA increases, the amount of 
man-days charged per day and the amount of jobs completed per day decreases. Thus, he 
concluded that longer availabilities complete less work per day. Whitney suggests this 
could stem from the second and third order effects of delaying work jobs that lie on the 
critical path. 
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A study conducted by Isely, Seagrave and Shiver in 2018 titled, “Analysis of Trends 
in Expended Man-Days for Selected SSN-688 Class Submarine Docking Selected 
Restricted Availabilities at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard,” focused on the relationship 
between hull age and duration of the DSRA. The group confirmed, from previous studies, 
that neither age nor OPINTERVAL equated to longer availabilities. Important for our 
thesis was the identification of the 500 Series and 100 Series SWLINs which accounted for 
significant growth in the overall man-days, and thus cost. This thesis provided the 
recommendation to analyze the 100 Series SWABs to attempt to identify trends or 
relationships within the increasing expended labor of the 100 Series (Isley et al., 2018). 
The last study conducted on DSRAs at PHNSY was by Wheeler in 2019. In his 
thesis titled, “An Analysis of The Increase in Duration and Cost for Selected Ship Work 
Line Item Numbers (SWLINs) at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard,” Wheeler focused on 
selected SWLINs within the 500 Series that directly contributed to the increase in man-
days during the selected DSRAs. These SWLINS contined work that was common across 
DSRAs. This finding indicated that cost variance (CV) is not trending as expected. The 
relationship between BQWS and CV is inversely related and opposite of expected. This 
indicated that inefficiency during planning and execution of the availability is contributing 
to schedule and cost issues. Additionally, Wheeler indicated a potential weakness in the 
feedback loop from one project to next. Evidence of human inefficiency related to Learning 
Curve Theory was noted during his thesis due to this unexpected BQWS and CV 
relationship (Wheeler, 2019). 
B. SUMMARY 
In the background, we provided the reader with sufficient information of the 688-
class submarine to understand the basic layout and class history that we deemed necessary 
to understand the scope of this thesis. Additionally, we discussed the historical decisions 
that have resulted in the submarine ships levels declining in a period of time when more 
are needed not fewer. The dramatic post war reduction in spending and acquisition of 
submarines has led the United States to its current situation it finds itself, a submarine 
inventory shortage. This shortage has already been felt by geographical leaders specifically 
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in the Pacific against a rising China and resurgent Russia and in the Atlantic with the 
increased tensions in the Middle East and increasing Russian influence.  
The maintenance and repair delays and cost overruns exacerbate the shortages of 
hulls by more submarines sitting idle waiting for repairs, or the repairs keeping them in the 
shipyard longer than expected. Though recent increases in funding for the Department of 
the Navy has been a significant help, more needs to be done to ensure maximum readiness.  
Next we introduced the main concepts and issues being discussed in the research 
below and provided some important details to understand the uniqueness and complexity 
of the maintenance being done on 688-class submarines in DSRAs at PHNSY. We defined 
key terms that will be discussed during this thesis which ensures concepts are not 
misunderstood.  
Finally, we covered the relevant research previously completed on this topic and 
discussed key findings that help explain our thesis basis and methodology. In general, 
reports from major government agencies (CBO and GAO) provide top-level analysis 
indicating there is a problem. Past research from students at NPS attempt to narrow the 
focus for shipyard leaders by analyzing data from past projects at PHNSY and finding 
SWLINs and SWABs that greatly increase the duration of the availability. Additionally, 
this research indicates that hull age at time of availability is not significant to the duration 
of the availability and that the 500 and 100 Series most significantly affect the duration of 
the DSRA.  
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VI. DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This chapter discusses where the data used in this thesis came from, what it does 
and does not include, the details focused on within the larger data set, and the significance 
of its security classification. Furthermore, this section discusses the assumptions made 
about this data in order to organize, analyze, and draw conclusions from it. 
A. DATA SOURCES USED 
To obtain the data used for this research, SUBMEPP, SUBPAC, and PHNSY 
provided autopsy reports from the nine DSRAs, Performance Metric Cost (PMC) 
spreadsheet developed from the nine DSRAs, associated training documents used by 
PHNSY and SUBMEPP, FRE and CA3 documents to track estimates of man-days in the 
planning stages, and the TFP rev B and C. We chose to use both the autopsy reports and 
PMS data to validate both sources and provide the most accurate information. The PMC 
data is more detailed as compared to the autopsy reports. The PMC data further reduces 
SWABs into their Job Order (JO) and Key Op (KO) codes. This distinction allowed us to 
provide additional information and specificity.  
These reports were generated after the completion of nine DSRAs competed at 
PHNSY from 2010 to 2015. Both the autopsy and the PMC data provide the user with 
information of planned work in man-days, actual work completed in man-days, new work, 
and total number of man-days for series of work. The work is broken down into series as 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Maintenance Series Breakdown 
SWLIN Series Series Major Ship System 
000 Support Services 
100 Hull Structure and Appurtenances 
200 Propulsion 
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SWLIN Series Series Major Ship System 
300 Electric Plant 
400 Communication and Control 
500 Auxiliary Systems  
600 Outfitting and Furnishings 
700 Armament 
800 Nuclear 
900 Project Management/Admin 
 
Within the 100 Series, the majority of baseline work in this series is associated with 
inspection, repairs, and preservation of built-in tanks, sail, hull welds, pressure and non-
pressure hull inspections and repairs, restoration of cathode protection anodes, corrosion 
associated with dampening and acoustic tiles, and restoration of the watertight access 
hatches, and escape trunks.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS  
a. All DSRAs Analyzed Have Similar Scope of Work 
This thesis assumes that work completed across all DSRAs in the data provided are 
similar enough to compare. Based on DSRAs being classified a minor CNO Availability, 
there is a notional amount of work that is consistently conducted from one ship to next. For 
the 100 Series, while notional work remains about the same (as prescribed by the TFP Rev. 
B), ship specific work accounts for an average 16% difference between the notional and 
CA3 man-day estimates with a standard deviation of 8%. 
b. Man-Day Increase May Not Result in Delay of Availability 
As a result of data limitations, this thesis assumes that an expended man-day could 
result in a risk to schedule. This is because, without a full understanding of critical path 
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items for each availability, an increase in man-days expended for any job not on the critical 
path does not necessarily result in an increase in overall availability duration..  
c. Component Maintenance Remains Relatively Constant 
As a result of changing requirements by NAVSEA and other organizations, the 
length of time and amount of work required to complete maintenance may change over 
time. To investigate and track requirement changes to maintenance items would require 
significant additional resources which would not contribute substantionally towards the 
research questions posed by this thesis. Thus, all work requirements as dictated by 
NAVSEA are assumed to be similar, or produce limited effects on total man-days 
expended. 
C. SUMMARY 
This section discussed the nature of the information found in the reports provided 
by SUBMEPP, COMSUBPAC and PHNSY, how that information is organized for 
analysis, and the significance of its NNPI classification. In addition, in order to organize, 
analyze, and make conclusions from this data, several assumptions are made.  
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VII. METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
Our analysis of the 100 Series SWLINs focused on breakout trends between 
SWABs, maintenance groups, and their underlying components. We analyzed these trends 
to determine which maintenance was likely substantively affecting DSRA availabilities at 
PHNSY.  
The 100 Series of maintenance involves primarily the hull and non-pressure hull 
along with hatches and bulkheads, all of these items are summarily more related to the age 
of the submarine than most systems since they are physically born at the time of 
construction. Thus, prior to investigating the 100 Series, we wanted to examine the effect 
of hull age on the expended labor. Following this examination, we focused on the bulk of 
our analysis that investigated major trends in man-days executed at the SWAB, group, and 
component levels of maintenance within the 100 Series. 
To help develop a estimation model for CA3 as well as actual expended man-days 
for a DSRA, we used Monte Carlo simulation to develop a proababistic model for all nine 
projects. The model determines percent difference between the desired attribute (CA3 or 
Actual man-days expended) and uses a distribution to help model randomness within 
maintenance activities. The goal of this is to better understand risk associated with random 
events that occur during major projects and to provide a method to better estimate man-
days expended and thus cost and duration of an availability.  
A. HULL-AGE CORRECTION FACTOR 
We wanted to revisit the analysis of the effect of hull age on the trend of increasing 
man-days. Previous research by Whitney in 2018 indicated that hull age did not explain 
the increase in man-days (Whitney, 2018). To do this, hull age was determined as the 
difference of start date of the DSRA and the submarine’s commissioning date. Hull age 
was calculated in days. We analyzed both total man-days and each Series, 100-700, to 
identify trends. The goal of this correction factor was to adjust expended man-days for each 
availability to a theoretical condition of the youngest hull in our data set.  
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In order to correct for hull age, all hulls were “corrected” to the youngest hull via a 
correction factor. The correction factor was unique to each hull and determined so that 
when multiplied by the hull age, the resultant age (in days) was that of the youngest hull. 
This correction factor was then used to adjust all man-days to the theoretical youngest hull 
by multiplying the correction factor times the given man-days value. With the data 
provided, the youngest hull modeled was USS Columbia (SSN-771) with a hull age of 
6,119 days. Table 2 contains the correction factors used in our analysis. 
Table 2. Hull-Age Correction Factor by Hull Youngest to Oldest 
Ship 
Hull Age at Start of 
DSRA (days) 
Correction Factor 
USS Columbia (SSN-771) 6,119 1.000 
USS Cheyenne (SSN-773) 6,184 0.989 
USS Charlotte (SSN-766) 6,199 0.987 
USS Columbus (SSN-762) 6,237 0.981 
USS Santa Fe (SSN-763) 6,604 0.926 
USS Greenville (SSN-772) 6,822 0.896 
USS Louisville (SSN-724) 9,495 0.644 
USS Jacksonville (SSN-699) 10,880 0.562 
USS Olympia (SSN-717) 11,119 0.550 
 
Our first correction was conducted on the total man-days expended to observe the 
trend in expended labor. Figure 1 is a graph of corrected man-days expended by availability 
oldest (left), newest (right).  
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Figure 1. Total Expended Man-Days Hull-Age Corrected 
by Availability Start Date 
Figure 1 illustrates that with hull-age corrections, the trend of expended man-days 
for an availability still increases. This demonstrates that regardless of hull age, total work 
conducted in man-days still increases. 
Once we determined that the overall man-days expended increased for the nine 
DSRAs, we evaluated all non-nuclear work completed across the 100–700 Series to verify 
which Series demonstrated the largest increases with the hull-age corrections. This is 
illustrated by Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Expended Labor in Man-Days by Availability Start Date with 
Hull-Age Correction 
 
Figure 3. Expended Labor in Man-Days by Availability Start Date with 
Hull-Age Correction Breakout of 100 and 500 Series 
The 100 Series and 500 Series experienced the highest growth followed by the 200 
Series of work. The 500 Series was previously evaluated by Isley, Seagrave, and Shiver in 
2018 and Wheeler in 2019. The 200 Series will not be evaluated due to its lower magnitude 
of increase over time and proportion of the total increase in man-days.  
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B. TRENDS IN SHIPYARD LABOR (MAN-DAYS) EXECUTED 
1. Analysis of 100 Series SWLINs 
As observed by Whitney in 2018, the trend in overall labor expended to complete 
these DSRAs has increased over time. Isley et al. (2018) identified the specific 500 Series 
SWABs, SWLINs, Groups, and Components that contributed to the largest increase in 
expended labor over time. Our analysis is similar in scope and depth, but conducted on the 
100 Series of maintenance. As shown in Figure 4, there is a clear positive trend in 100 
Series expended labor (man-days) across the DSRAs, this addressed Research Question 2. 
Thus, our first task for Research Question 3 was to examine the SWABs within the 100 
Series to determine which of them consistently contained the most labor, and additionally 
showed growth across the DSRAs. To accomplish this, we used the Job Order / Key Op 
(JOKO) data to determine the expended labor and plotted across the DSRAs, arranged by 
availability start date as seen in Figure 5. Of note, one SWAB, 156 (Ballast), is excluded 
from our analysis because it doesn’t have any repair component and serves to track the 
performance of ballasting services during the DSRA. Within Figure 5, it is obvious that 
three SWABs, namely 131, 132, and 176, make up the large majority of the expended labor. 
These three SWABs comprise 85% of the expended labor within the 100 Series. We 
decided to focus our analysis on these three SWABs primarily due to the magnitude 
difference in labor, but did an analysis on the other four smaller contributors and found that 
they did not meaningfully affect the total Series. While the 176 SWAB accounts for the 
greatest man-days expended at 34% of the total 100 Series, it possesses a negative trend 
over the DSRAs. Therefore, we chose to further analyze SWABs 131 (Pressure Hull) and 
132 (Non-Pressure Hull), which demonstrated positive trends over time (Figure 6), to 
search for the likely cause(s) of 100 Series overall increase in expended labor. 
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Figure 5. Labor Expended for all SWABS within the 100 Series Arranged 
by Availability Start Date 
 
Figure 6. Labor Expended for SWABs 131 and 132 Arranged by 























111 Superstructure and Fairwater
131 Pressure Hull
132 Non-Pressure Hull
170 Watertight Hatches (Pressure Hull),
Trunks and Enclosures
176 Tanks, Built-in
177 Internal Structural Bulkheads
178 Platforms, Walking Flats and Non-
Structural Bulkheads
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Next, we wanted to observe any correlation of availability duration with the 
expended labor of the complete 100 Series and our identified largest growth contributors, 
SWABS 131 and 132. Shown in Figure 7, there tends to be more 100 Series expended labor 
as the duration of the availability increases, this is expected and similar to the observed 500 
Series maintenance identified by Isley, Seagrave, and Shiver (Isley et. al, 2018). In Figure 
8 we arranged the 131 and 132 SWABs by the duration of the availabilities. While the trend 
is positive, indicating duration may be affected by the increase in expended labor for these 
two SWABs, the best-fit trend lines do not account for much of the variation in the data. 
This is expected with our small dataset, and we continued to dig deeper into the group and 
component levels within both SWABs to find the cause for the observed increases. 
 
Figure 7. Labor Expended within the 100 Series 
Arranged by Availability Duration 
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Figure 8. Labor Expended for SWABs 131 and 132 
Arranged by Availability Duration 
2. Analysis of Groups within the 131 SWAB 
Following the identification of the 131 SWAB (Pressure Hull) Series as a potential 
driver for the increase in man-days expended, further analysis was conducted to isolate 
maintenance items driving the increase. To conduct this analysis, maintenance groups were 
selected from each DSRA and analyzed by availability start date (Figure 9).  
To better answer Research Questions 3 and 4, two groups illustrated the largest 
growth within the 27 (Inspection and Surveys), 44 (Valves), 82 (Preservation) group. The 
27 group showed the most significant growth compared to the other groups within the 131 
SWAB. The 82 group showed the next largest growth, followed by the 44 group. The total 
man-days for the 131 SWAB averaged 1981 man-days. Figure 10 shows the trend in major 
common maintenance groups of the 131 SWAB. The total man-days shows a strong 
increase over time, followed by the main driver the 27 Series. Figure 9 also includes work 
classified as New Work.  
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Figure 9. Labor Expended for all Groups within SWAB 131 Arranged by 
Availability Start Date 
Without New Work included, Figure 10 demonstrates a consistent increase in the 
total man-days expended by availability with similar increases to 27. This indicates that 
New Work makes up about 13.4% of total work conducted in the 131 SWAB.  
 
Figure 10. Labor Expended for all Groups within SWAB 131 without New 





























3. Analysis of Groups within the 132 SWAB 
Following the identification of the 132 SWAB as a possible significant growth 
driver in expended labor, three primary groups were identified to be consistent with all of 
the DSRAs. These were the groups of 27 (Inspection and Surveys), 74 (Cathodic Protection 
Anodes), and 82 (Preservation). There were an additional four groups, which were included 
in a select few of the different DSRAs, but not consistently enough to be significant. In 
Figure 11, Group 27, Inspections and Surveys, showed a clear and positive growth trend 
over the DSRAs. This assisted in answering Research Questions 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 11. Labor Expended for All Groups within the 132 SWAB Arranged 
by Availability Start Date 
4. Analysis of Components within Group 131.27 
To answer Research Question 4 fully, our analysis continued one level further down 
from the Group and into the Components of the expended labor. For the 131.27, the nine 
DSRAs often contained components that were only worked within a couple of the DSRAs, 
though some of that work was significant in terms of man-days expended, the trend could 
not be established. To conduct the trend analysis, only work conducted on a minimum of 
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eight hulls were considered. The four common components were 0136, 0150, 0165, and 
0142. Figure 12 shows the trend of these components by availability start date. There is a 
strong upward trend for 27.0165 (Pressure Hull [VISIBLE FROM DRY DOCK]). This 
indicates there is significant growth in the labor required to complete maintenance related 
to this component. 
 
Figure 12. Labor Expended within SWAB 131 Group 27 Arranged by 
Availability Start Date 
5. Analysis of Components within Group 132.27 
To answer Research Question 4 fully, our analysis continued one level further down 
from the Group and into the Components of the expended labor. While some DSRAs 
included up to nine components within the 27 (Inspection and Surveys) Group, five of the 
components were used across all nine DSRAs, and none of the remaining four appeared in 
more than three DSRAs. Therefore, we analyzed the five consistent components to 
determine significant growth drivers among them. Shown in Figure 13, three of the five 
groups stood out both in magnitude and growth, they were 27.0200 (Exterior of Non-
Pressure Hull), 27.1480 (Fairing Covers Over Retractable Towed Array Stowage Tubes), 
and 27.0320 (Non-Watertight Access Hatches, Cover Plates, & Access Manhole Covers). 
However, to answer Research Question 4 and shown in Figure 14, one component, the 
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27.0200 (Exterior of the Non-Pressure Hull) was identified as the significant contributor to 
the total growth exhibited in SWAB 132.  
 
Figure 13. Labor Expended within SWAB 132 Group 27 Arranged by 
Availability Start Date 
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Figure 14. Group 27 Labor Expended by Components 0200, 1480, and 0320 
Arranged by Availability Start Date 
C. NEW WORK ANALYSIS 
1. 100 Series New Work 
“New Work” as per discussion with SUBMEPP refers to work completed during 
the availability that is added after the generation of Corporate Cost Assessment 3 (CA3). 
All work included in the Availability Work Package (AWP) prior to the generation of CA3 
is considered “Baseline” work. An important distinction exists between New Work and 
“Growth Work.” Growth work refers to work found during the course of the availability 
that is added once found. Therefore, all Growth Work is New Work, but not all New Work 
is Growth Work. Our data does not distinguish between the two; therefore, New Work is 
only defined as work added after CA3 in our thesis. New Work is denoted by “ANW” 
within our dataset. 
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As shown in the Figure 15, when expended labor is broken out into both Baseline 
Work and New Work, both increase over time. New Work accounted for an average of 
8.7% of total man-days across within each of the nine DSRAs, while accounting for 9.1% 
of the total labor expended within the 100 Series for all nine DSRAs. These numbers are 
consistent, indicating that within the 100 Series, a point estimate of 9% of total 100 Series 
labor will be from ANW. Figure 16 shows more clearly the minor growth of New Work. 
However, as stated above, the 100 Series New Work is relatively consistent as a percentage 
of total work, therefore New Work does not account for significant increases in total 
expended labor.  
When arranged by DSRA duration (Figure 17), as asked in Research Question 5, 
the relationship between Duration and increasing New Work is apparent. This supports the 
logical conclusion that if you have more New Work, you tend to have a longer DSRA 
duration. This could be due to any number of reasons, but the relationship does seem sound, 
if you desire a shorter DSRA, seek to add less New Work. 
 
Figure 15. 100 Series Baseline and New Work Expended Labor Arranged by 
Availability Start Date 
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Figure 16. 100 Series New Work Expended Labor Arranged by Availability 
Start Date 
 
Figure 17. 100 Series New Work Expended Labor Arranged by Availability 
Duration 
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2. 100 Series Cost Variance 
Wheeler in 2019 identified that within the 500 Series, Cost Variance (CV) does not 
trend in a way that is typical for learning organizations that should lower cost based on 
Learning Curve Theory (Wheeler, 2019). As defined in Earned Value Management, CV is 
the difference between the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) and the Actual 
Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). Within the 100 Series, as seen in Figure 18, our analysis 
yielded a negatively sloped CV trend line, indicated that, similar to Wheeler’s conclusion 
for the 500 Series, the 100 Series is also not improving over time. One would expect the 
feedback loop over the course of the nine DSRAs to have incorporated additional work, 
improve labor practices and management, and yield better estimates for the BCWP, which 
would over time drive the CV back towards zero. Unfortunately, this is not observed, and 
we can therefore say that the organization has not improved either its practices or 
estimation capability. 
 
Figure 18. 100 Series Cost Variance Arranged by Availability 
Start Date 
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D. COST ESTIMATE PREDICTION MODELS 
1. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation was used in this thesis to better determine the maximum 
value for various Corporate Cost Estimates. Monte Carlo simulations are a computerized 
iterative mathematical technique that is used to approximate the likelihood of outcomes by 
running thousands of trail scenarios. This allows the user to conduct a quantitative risk 
assessment and decision analysis. The simulation takes user inputs, develops a range of 
values based on a probability distribution, and it calculates results. The model runs for a 
defined amount of trials, each trial using a different set of random numbers. The Monte 
Carlo simulation produces a distribution of possible outcomes from which risk can be 
assessed and decisions can be made. 
2. Why Monte Carlo Simulation Is Beneficial 
This type of simulation is advantageous for this topic because hundreds of iterations 
of randomly created data points can be assessed and produce a higher confidence value. 
With few data points currently available (nine DSRAs), without Monte Carlo simulation, 
information would have excessive variability and would provide limited information to the 
end user. Additionally, just using Excel to evaluate the data limits the amount of risk 
information that can be analyzed.  
For this application, three different distributions were modeled. With limited data 
points available post OPINTERVAL change, only the nine DSRA's data were available to 
model. With the completion of additional projects the distributions can be changed and 
updated as needed. The three distributions selected and analyzed were lognormal, uniform, 
and triangular. These distributions will be discussed below. 
a. Lognormal Distribution 
The Lognormal Distribution is widely used in situations where values are positively 
skewed with uncertainty variables that can increase without limits but cannot go below a 
lower bound. This distribution has larger tails than a normal distribution and may better 
compensate for risk in the extremems of the simulation. Due to the shape of the distribution, 
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with the majority of the values occur near the minimum, this distribution will result in a 
lower estimation compared to the other distributions used. A weakness of this distribution 
is the values on the lower bound is confined to a finite value. With only nine observations, 
the lower bound was defined by the minimum percent difference observed. The model then 
assumes no value can be less than this which introduces potential error. This model may 
best fit the data because the performance of one DSRA to another may be constant within 
a range of performance making the percent difference between Cost Estimates similar. 
Outliers have a lower probability of occurance, both in more man-days expended and less 
man-days expended.  
b. Uniform Distribution 
The uniform distribution was selected as another distribution based on its over 
estimation of risk in the extremes of the distribution. Uniform distributions allow events to 
occur at the defined min and max to be equally likely to occur, thus maximizing risk and 
resulting in more man-days expended. Modeling with this distribution is the safest and is 
expected to indicate the highest percentage difference of all three distributions. However, 
a weakness of this distribution is the defined lower and upper bounds based on only nine 
observations.  
c. Triangular Distribution 
The Triangular distribution is commonly used in project management planning 
where the min, max, and mean can be established. A weakness of this distribution is the 
defined min and max values required. The minimum value of the distribution is possible to 
be less than the previous cost estimate, but not less than zero man-days. The maximum 
does not have a maximum value and thus is challenging to estimate. To alieviate this, when 
modeling the in Crystal Ball, the lower bound was 10%, the middle was defined as the 
mean, and the upper bound was 90%. This allows the model to select random values above 
and below the witnessed min and max within the nine data points, being more conservative.   
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3. Using CA2 to Estimate CA3 
To better estimate the CA3 maximum expected expended man-days, CA2 data from 
the nine DSRAs was used. Using Crystal Ball, an add on for Microsoft Excel to run Monte 
Carlo simulations, three distributions were modeled. Since PHNSY has not conducted a 
statistically large amount of DSRAs, insufficient data existed to best fit a distribution (min 
15 observations required). Selected for this estimation was a lognormal distribution, 
uniform distribution, and a triangular distribution. Within each DSRA, the percent 
difference was modeled between CA2 and CA3. Based on the data provided, the CA2 and 
CA3 data were correlated at 0.95. To ensure accuracy of the model, 40,000 simulations 
were conducted. This number was selected based on increasing the number of simulations 
run incrementally and finding negligible changes between the results.  
The distribution models' results are reported in Table 3. Results and confidence 
interval are reported in man-days. The values reported are for a probability of 85%, 
meaning that there remains a 15% chance a DSRA will exceed this value on CA3. Figures 
19 through 24 are the Crystal Ball outputs for the various distributions. 
Table 3. CA2 to CA3 Estimation Results by Distribution 
Parameter Result in man-days 95% Confidence Interval 
Lognormal Distribution 8,493 8,315-8,874 
Uniform Distribution 11,159 11,055-11,239 
Triangular Distribution 11,818 11,689-12,016 
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Figure 19. Lognormal Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 
 
Figure 20. Lognormal Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 Confidence Interval 
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Figure 21. Uniform Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 
 
Figure 22. Uniform Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 Confidence Interval 
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Figure 23. Triangular Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 
 
Figure 24. Triangular Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days CA3 
Based on CA2 Confidence Interval 
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4. Using FRE Data to Estimate the Maximum Final Man-Days 
Expended 
The FRE data is the most accurate estimate of how many man-days will be 
expended to complete the availability taking into account ship condition. To estimate the 
maximum numbers of final expended man-days, a similar process was used as described 
above. Crystal Ball was used to model three different distribution models. Since there is 
larger variability in the data between FRE and Final expended man-days for each of the 
nine DSRAs, the results indicated a larger number of man-days needed to be added to the 
entire project for high confidence. The results for this model are listed in Table 4. Figures 
25 through 30 are the Crystal Ball outputs for the various distributions. 
Table 4. FRE to Actual Final Estimation Results by Distribution 
85% Parameter Result in man-days 95% Confidence Interval 
Lognormal Distribution 19,387 18,729–20,024 
Uniform Distribution 33,482 33,130–33,820 
Triangular Distribution 35,974 35,261–36,546 
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Figure 25. Lognormal Distribution for Actual Expended Man-Days Based on 
FRE 
 
Figure 26. Lognormal Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days 
Actual Based on FRE Confidence Interval 
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Figure 27. Uniform Distribution for Actual Expended Man-Days Based on 
FRE 
 
Figure 28. Uniform Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days Actual 
Based on FRE confidence interval 
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Figure 29. Triangular Distribution for Actual Expended Man-Days Based on 
FRE 
 
Figure 30. Triangular Distribution for Maximum Expended Man-Days Actual 
Based on FRE Confidence Interval
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. FINDINGS  
(1) Applying a correction factor for the age of hull at start of DSRA does 
not account for growth in expended labor 
In reference to Research Question 1, after applying a simple correction factor to the 
expended labor of the nine DSRAs in our data set, we still observed a significant increase 
in man-days. This indicates that while it is expected for the hull age (and all components 
therein) to affect the amount of work necessary to maintain the condition-based 
maintenance standard, our correction could not account for the increase in expended labor. 
Thus, the increase exists within the maintenance conducted. 
(2) 100 Series of maintenance demonstrates consistent growth in expended 
labor 
In reference to Research Question 2, as Whitney (2018) identified, the 100 Series 
of maintenance demonstrates clear and consistent growth over the DSRAs analyzed. 
(3) SWABs 131 and 132 contributed significantly to the growth of the 
expended labor in the 100 Series 
Within the 100 Series of maintenance, the two largest and most significant 
contributors to the growth in expended labor were the 131 and 132 SWABs. These are the 
Pressure and Non-Pressure Hull groups of maintenance. Specifically, the maintenance 
actions within these SWABs which demonstrate the largest and most consistent growth is 
Inspection and Surveys of major items. These items answer Research Questions 3 and 4. 
(4) New Work is relatively constant and is not a major contributor to 
expended labor growth 
Our results indicate that the answer to Research Question 5 is not readily apparent 
in this data set. While a growth in New Work did occur, it was not consistent across 
DSRAs, and as it comprised of only 9% of the total work within the 100 Series, this 
relatively low amount of New Work compared to the significant growth of total work leads 
54 
us to conclude that while New Work growth is occurring, it should not be a focus area for 
further research or examination by SUBMEPP or COMSUBPAC. 
(5) New Work is related to longer duration 
Per Research Question 5, we were interested in knowing if 100 Series New Work 
was related to the overall duration of the DSRAs. Essentially, if there was more New Work 
in a DSRA, was the duration of that DSRA longer? Our analysis demonstrates that there is 
a positive correlation between an increase in New Work and a longer duration. This could 
be caused by many factors, but it logically follows that if you do not desire to extend the 
duration of a DSRA, you should seek to add less New Work. Though New Work does 
contribute significantly to the overall man-days expended in a given DSRA, its effect on 
duration does seem to be significant. This may be related to the shortened planning timeline 
which exists after CA3, but before the start of the availability. 
(6) Cost variance does not trend as expected 
Similar to Wheeler’s 2019 analysis of cost variance within the 500 Series, we 
observed that CV does not tend towards zero as would be expected for a learning 
organization such as PHNSY. In fact, it trends negatively, which is indicative of further 
issues in either estimation or work practices. 
(7) Improved man-day estimates are required by the Shipyard as well as 
naval organizations 
During the effort to address Research Question 6, the predictive models generated 
indicated that the estimates conducted at CA2, CA3 and the FRE are not representative of 
the final expended man-days for these DSRAs. The FRE to Actual Man-days expended 
model demonstrated that the estimates conducted by the shipyard require improvement to 
lower the variability between the estimate and actual. Conversely, this also supports the 
other findings in this thesis, that the shipyard is unable to meet their estimates and needs to 
perform maintenance more efficiently in order to meet these goals.  
The FRE to Actual model supports currently adding 19,536 man-days to the FRE 
to achieve an 85% probability the actual will end up less than that value. Therefore, 15% 
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of the time, the DSRA’s expended man-days may be greater than the model predicts. This 
could be significant for shipyard and COMSUBPAC planners in order to have a better 
estimation of actual man-days expended greater than 6 months in advance of completion 
of the project.  
The CA2 to CA3 model improves upon the current model used by SUPMEPP in 
which only historical differences are used to calculate the expected increase to CA2. This 
model, though only based on nine DSRAs provides an indication that if planners add 8,517 
man-days to the CA2 estimate, there is an 85% probability that the CA3 estimate will be 
less than that value.  
B. SUMMARY 
To summarize, our research set to answer six questions. Listed below are those 
questions and answers: 
(1) Does controlling for hull age help explain the identified increase in 
expended man-days over the studied DSRAs? 
No. There is consistent and significant growth in expended labor which is 
unexplained by applying a simple hull-age correction factor. 
(2) Within the identified increase of expended man-days across the DSRAs, 
what is the contribution of the maintenance included in the 100 Series? 
Maintenance within the 100 Series accounts for significant and consistent growth 
which, in conjunction with the 500 Series accounts for the large majority of increase in 
expended labor over time. 
(3) Which Ship Work Authorization Boundary’s (SWABs) within the 100 
Series show the largest growth over time? 
SWABs 131 (Pressure Hull) and 132 (Non-Pressure Hull) demonstrated the largest 
growth over time. 
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(4) Within the growing SWABs, which Ship Work List Item Numbers 
(SWLINs) and subset maintenance groups and components are 
contributing most to the growth of the 100 Series? 
Within both SWABs 131 and 132, the largest contributor to growth across the 
DSRAs was Group 27 (Inspection and Surveys).  
(5) Does categorized “New Work” demonstrate a relationship with DSRA 
duration and is it significant to expended labor? 
Categorized “New Work” does demonstrate a relationship to duration of a DSRA. 
When a DSRA has more New Work, it tends to last longer in duration. New Work over 
time does not demonstrate a similar magnitude in growth as baseline or overall expended 
labor. 
(6) Can a model be developed to better estimate the maximum expended 
man-days for CA3 and a completed DSRA?  
Yes. A simple probabilistic model was developed using a Monte Carlo simulation 
that estimates maximum man-days expended based on the FRE as well as the number of 
man-days CA3 will indicate based on CA2. This technique can assist planners in defining 
the upper bound of a DSRA costs and thus allow better financial planning.  
C. FUTURE STUDIES 
(1) Identify and analyze SWABs and GCMA line items on the critical path 
With the information provided in this thesis as well as previous work, analyze 
shipyard schedules prior to the start of the DSRA, identify critical path work or near critical 
path work and determine if work with significant delays identified within the 100 and 500 
Series affects the critical path work and thus duration of the availability 
(2) Analyze performance of DSRAs across other shipyards 
Analyzing the 500 Series and 100 Series for completed DSRAs across other 
shipyards and comparing the performance trends between shipyards will indicate further if 
PHNSY has yard-specific problems it needs to address. Our current analysis gives no 
indication if this inflation of baseline work and new work for the 100 Series is also true in 
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other shipyards that conduct similar maintenance. Looking at DSRAs during a similar time 
period may provide leaders a better indication of performance for PHNSY.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Evaluate planning and labor estimation processes at PHNSY 
Previous research (Whitney [2018], Isley et al. [2018], Wheeler [2019]) as well as 
our own, has determined that significant and consistent growth in expended labor occurred 
over the nine DSRAs analyzed. Along with the growth in expended labor, the duration, on 
the aggregate, also increased. While we have been able to identify specific maintenance 
items which have contributed, we cannot tie delays and growth in maintenance to the 
increase in duration, due to lack of critical path project planning data. Thus, in an attempt 
to improve and optimize performance of the PHNSY, we would recommend an in-depth 
review of maintenance planning and scheduling practices by an external organization 
which specializes in such activities. 
(2) Utilize probabilistic modeling for cost estimation and schedule risk 
Current methods employed by SUBMEPP to develop Corporate Cost Assessments 
rely on averages of historical differences observed between previous projects’ CA2 and 
CA3. This results in underestimation of expended man-days and thus increases risk to the 
overall project. A probabilistic model using Monte Carlo simulation allows planners to 
better estimate CA2 as well as Actual Final expended man-days, as described in our thesis. 
(3) Report on the continuous availability work package feedback loop 
SUBMEPP incrementally updates the notional Availability Work Package (AWP) 
for specific classes of submarines based on the time-in-life maintenance overhaul which 
will be performed. These updates are based on observed trends and tendencies for specific 
maintenance actions which are becoming more (or less) frequent, or requiring more (or 
less) labor to perform, fleet-wide. However, as identified first by Wheeler (2019) and 
confirmed by our thesis, if the feedback loop were being utilized effectively, the amount 
of “New Work” or “Growth Work” should be decreasing as baseline is increased. This 
would be most clearly shown in the Cost Variance analysis, with a more accurate BQWS 
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leading to a zero or positive Cost Variance over time. However, this has not been observed, 
and in fact the opposite is occurring. Therefore, the feedback loop must be analyzed for 
effectiveness. 
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